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IRS ACCESS TO TAX ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS:
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AND POLICY CONCERNS
INTRODUCTION

Public corporations are required by the federal securities laws' to
prepare and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission financial reports2 certified 3 by an independent public accountant. 4 The
certification process requires the accountant to audit the corporation's
books and records to determine whether corporate transactions were
properly recorded 5 and whether the related financial statements were
prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles. 6

1. Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976). In enacting the securities laws, Congress gave the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) broad
powers to prescribe the form in which the information required to be included in the
financial reports shall be set forth. 15 U.S.C. § 77(s) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)
(1976).
3. Pursuant to its powers under the securities laws, the SEC promulgated
Regulation S-X. 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1982). Regulation S-X is the principal accounting
regulation of the SEC in its administration of the securities laws, and sets forth the
requirements of certification. Id. § 210.2-02.
4. Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X provides a statutory basis for the independence
of the accountant. Id. § 210.2-01(b). The independent status of the accountant has
always been an important concern of the SEC. In an early decision under the 1933
Act, the SEC stated that
[t]he insistence of the Act on a certification by an 'independent' accountant
signifies the real function which certification should perform. That function
is the submission to an independent and impartial mind of the accounting
practices and policies of registrants. The history of finance well illustrates
the importance and need for submission to such impartial persons . . . to
the end that present and prospective security holders will be protected
against unsound accounting practices ....
In re Cornucopia Gold Mines, 1 S.E.C. 364, 367 (1936). See generally L. Rappaport,
SEC Accounting and Procedure ch. 26 (3d ed. 1972) (discussion on accountant's
independence).
5. See J. Dearden & J. Shank, Financial Accounting and Reporting: A Contemporary Emphasis 189 (1975). See generally J. Burton, R. Palmer & R. Kay, Handbook of Accounting and Auditing 12-2 to 12-5 (1981) (discussion of audit objectives)
[hereinafter cited as Handbook of Accounting]. Although examination of all entries
in the corporate records may not be feasible, the auditor can achieve reasonable
assurance that the results are fair by the use of a sampling procedure. Id. at 14-2.
6. See Handbook of Accounting, supra note 5, at 9-6 to 9-8. Although the SEC
has the power to prescribe the form in which the required financial information must
be set forth, see supra note 2, in 1938 it voted to accept for filing under the securities
laws financial statements prepared according to accounting principles for which
there is "substantial authoritative support," and that are not contrary to any express
SEC position. Accounting Series Release No. 4, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,005. The Commission has thus generally deferred to the
accounting profession to establish standards. Handbook of Accounting, supra note 5,
at 40-5; see L. Rappaport, supra note 4, at 2.5.
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Statements prepared according to these principles are
deemed to re7
flect fairly the financial position of the corporation.
Generally accepted accounting principles require that the corporation account for any contingencies, the occurrence of which may
result in a liability. 8 Given the complexities in the Internal Revenue
Code (Code), 9 one contingency that must be accounted for is the
payment of additional income tax that may be required if the corporation has taken a challengeable tax position.' 0 The financial statements

In 1973 the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 150, [1937-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,172, reaffirming the profession's role in setting
accounting standards. This release provides that principles, standards and practices
promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board shall be considered by the
SEC as having substantial authoritative support, and those contrary thereto to have
no such support. Id. The Financial Accounting Standards Board, established by the
profession to promulgate and maintain the standards governing financial accounting
and reporting, is an arm of the Financial Accounting Foundation, a non-profit
corporation independent of other professional accounting organizations. Handbook
of Accounting, supra note 5, at 40-5 to 40-7.
7. See Handbook of Accounting, supranote 5, at 9-8, 12-2. The author gives the
following as an example of what might typically be included in an accountant's
report: "In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements . . . presentfairly the
financial position of ABC, Incorporated and subsidiaries at December 31, 1979 and
1978, and the results of their operations and the changes in their financial position for
the years then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles
applied on a consistent basis." Id. at 9-6 (emphasis in original).
8. Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 5: Accounting for Contingencies 99 1, 33-39 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as FASB No. 5]. The SEC also specifically requires this information in the filings
required to be made under the securities laws. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.502(25) (1982).
FASB No. 5 requires the corporation to accrue an estimated loss from a contingency as a charge to income if the future event that will confirm the loss is "probable"
(likely to occur) and estimable. If a loss is not probable, but is "reasonably possible"
(more than remote but less than likely), the nature of the contingency and an
estimate of the possible loss must be disclosed in the financial statements. FASB No.
5, supra, 99 3(a)-(b), 8-10; see J. Booker & B. Jarnagin, Financial Accounting
Standards: Explanation and Analysis 230-31 (1979); Ijiri, The Dilemma in Contingencies and Reporting Forecasts, J. Acct., Nov. 1980, at 38. A "contingency" is
defined in FASB No. 5 as "an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances
involving uncertainty as to possible gain . . . or loss . . . to an enterprise that will
ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to occur." FASB
No. 5, supra, 1 1; see Nath, Internal Revenue Service Summonses for "Sensitive"
Accountants' Papers, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1561, 1565-66 (1981).
9. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1982)
("The income tax laws, as every citizen knows, are far from a model of clarity . ...
[N]o taxpayer completes a return with the certainty that the IRS will agree with the
bottom line.
...
); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d
Cir. 1982).
10. Note, A Balancing Approach to the Discoverability of Accountants' Tax
Liability Workpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 60 Wash.
U.L.Q. 185, 187-88 (1982) [hereinafter cited as A BalancingApproach].
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of the corporation must reflect a reserve to cover the eventuality of
such contingent liability." In certifying these statements, the accountant is consequently obliged to determine the adequacy of such reserve. 12 This process requires the accountant to evaluate the strengths
and weaknesses of the positions taken by the corporation on its tax
return.' 3 In so doing,
the accountant makes an assessment, often on a
"worst case" basis,' 4 of the possible outcome of any litigation over the
challengeable positions in the return.' 5 If the accountant determines
that the contingent tax liability reserve is inadequate, the corporation's financial statements must be adjusted to reflect the vulnerability
of the corporation to assessment of additional tax.' 6 Should the corporate management refuse to make such an adjustment, the accountant is required to disclose the inadequacy of the reserve in his written
opinion. 17
The workpapers' I generated by the accountant in the process of
assessing the adequacy of the corporation's contingent tax reserve have
increasingly been sought by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or
11. FASB No. 5, supra note 8, 38; see A BalancingApproach, supra note 10, at
187-88. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12. A BalancingApproach, supra note 10, at 187-88; see Nath, supra note 8, at
1566.
13. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 951 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615
(10th Cir. 1977).
14. Caplin, Should the Service Be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual
Workpapers?, 51 J. Tax'n 194, 194 (1979); Nath, supra note 8, at 1571; A Balancing
Approach, supra note 10, at 188-89. In the process of assessing the adequacy of the
corporation's tax reserve, the accountant attempts to elicit from the corporate management "'what the worst possible nightmare is the client can conceive can happen if
every assumption on which he based his tax were to go against him in some kind of
litigation. He may think up contingencies even more lurid than the worst contingencies a revenue agent comes up with ....
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413
F. Supp. 942, 953 (D. Colo. 1975), affd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
15. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953 (D. Colo. 1975), afJ'd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); see United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 537
(5th Gir. 1982); Nath, supra note 8, at 1569.
16. See L. Rappaport, supra note 4, at 2.7; Nath, supra note 8, at 1565-66. See
supra notes 8-10.
17. See Handbook of Accounting, supra note 5, at 16-5 to 16-8; L. Rappaport,
supra note 4, at 25.20-.22. The written opinion of the accountant is the certification
required under the securities laws. See id. at 24.5.
18. These workpapers, which are termed "tax accrual workpapers" in this Note,
are referred to by the courts by various terms. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d
530, 534 (5th Cir. 1982) (tax pool analysis); United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
677 F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 1982) (tax accrual workpapers); United States v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1977) (tax pool analysis); United States v.
Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 997 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (tax provision
memorandum); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 325 n.3,
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Service) in conducting audits of corporate tax returns. 9 Tax accrual
workpapers are valuable to the Service in that the independent accountant's assessment of the corporation's tax vulnerabilities provides
a definitive roadmap of the soft spots in the return.20 Additionally, the
workpapers may reveal the willingness of the taxpayer to settle or
litigate various positions taken on the return, giving the Service 21
a
distinct advantage in the resolution of issues raised during an audit.
The accounting profession has vigorously resisted the efforts of the
IRS to reach these workpapers,2 2 viewing them as beyond the summons power provided in section 7602 of the Code because they are not
23
relevant to a determination of the corporation's actual tax liability.
Alternatively, the profession argues that even though the workpapers

327 (D. Mass.) (tax accrual workpapers), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir.
1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to the second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980).
19. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 547 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood,
J., dissenting) ("The practice of attempting in cases of this kind to summon the tax
pool analysis is almost uniformly recognized as being both a qualitatively significant
and a relatively recent expansion of the Service's prior practice."); see United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 1982).
20. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 545 (5th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.
1977); Caplin, supra note 14, at 194; A Balancing Approach, supra note 10, at 189.
21. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 1982);
Garbis & Struntz, The Second Circuit'sArthur Young Decision: A Privilegefor Tax
Accrual Workpapers, 57 J. Tax'n 66, 68 (1982).
22. Nath, supra note 8, at 1561-62; see Caplin, supra note 14, at 194, 197 n.1;
Garbis & Struntz, supra note 21, at 67.
23. See infra pt. I. The summons power of the IRS is codified in I.R.C. § 7602
(1976), which provides as follows:
§ 7602. Examination of books and witnesses
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person
for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect. of any internal revenue tax,
or collecting any such liability, the Secretary is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material-to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession,
custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the
business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
other person the Secretary may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary
at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books,
papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as
may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may
be relevant or material to such inquiry.
Id. The summons power of the IRS is not self-executing. If a summons is challenged,
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may be relevant and within the summons power, the judiciary should
24
nevertheless deny enforcement of the summons for policy reasons.
The courts that have been confronted with the enforceability of a
summons for tax accrual workpapers have reached divergent results.
This Note examines the issues that a court should consider in deciding
whether to enforce a summons issued pursuant to section 7602 of the
Code, and the policy concerns that come into play when the summons
is directed at tax accrual workpapers. Additionally, this Note analyzes
the Second Circuit's recent decision in United States v. Arthur Young
& Co., 2 5 in which the court fashioned a work-product privilege that
shelters these workpapers from the Service in most instances.
I.

RELEVANCE

A. The Shifting Relevance Standard
In United States v. Powell,2 6 the Supreme Court ruled that to
obtain enforcement of a summons issued pursuant to section 7602, the
IRS must make a preliminary showing2 7 that: 1) the investigation will
be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose; 28 2) the inquiry will
the Service must seek enforcement in the federal district court for the district in
which the taxpayer resides. Id. §§ 7402(b), 7604(b); see A Balancing Approach,
supra note 10, at 190-91 & n.51.
24. See infra pt. II.
25. 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982).
26. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
27. The government's burden of proof does not rise to the level of probable cause.
Id. at 57; United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 330 (D. Mass.),
appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as
moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to the
second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980). Rather, the government's burden of proof
has been characterized as "minimal," requiring only a prima facie showing. United
States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Davis, 636
F.2d 1028, 1034 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); see United States v.
Silvestain, 668 F.2d 1161, 1163 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526,
536 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1712 (1982); United States v. Garden
State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 71 (3d Cir. 1979).
28. 379 U.S. at 57. The summons power provided for in § 7602 is not available to
aid the IRS in a purely criminal investigation. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l
Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 314-16 (1978); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 533
(1971); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1036 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
862 (1981); United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 328 (D. Mass.), appeal
dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623
F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to the second party,
623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Smith, 373 F. Supp. 14, 17 (S.D. Miss.
1975). By its very nature, however, a tax investigation is likely to raise questions of
both criminal and civil liability. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298,
309 (1978); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 326 (1973); see United States v.
Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928, 935 (D. Md. 1968). When an investigation involves both
civil and criminal probes, the Supreme Court has placed the burden on the summonee to disprove the existence of a valid civil tax determination purpose by the Service.
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be relevant to that purpose;2 9 3) the information sought is not already
within the possession of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner); 30 and 4) the administrative steps required under the Code
have been followed. 3' Once the Service has made this preliminary
showing, the burden shifts to the summonee to disprove the presence
of one or more of these elements. 32 Although the target of the summons will frequently allege the absence of several elements, 33 the
primary argument advanced to defeat a summons for34 tax accrual
workpapers is that they are not relevant to the inquiry.
United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316 (1978). Also, the Court has
refused to draw a line barring the use of a summons issued pursuant to section 7602
merely because the taxpayer is also under investigation for criminal fraud. Id. at 31416; Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 535-36 (1971). See generally Comment, The Improper Purpose Challenge to a Section 7602 Summons, 31 Tax Law.
226 (1977).
29. 379 U.S. at 57. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
30. 379 U.S. at 58. Courts have construed the term "in possession" literally,
refusing to accept the argument that because the Service has possession of all the
records of transactions from which tax accrual workpapers are derived, it has constructive possession of the information in the workpapers. E.g., United States v.
Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979);
United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 330 (D. Mass. 1979),
appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as
moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), af'd as to the
second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413
F. Supp. 942, 950 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); see Nath,
supra note 8, at 1574 n.53.
31. 379 U.S. at 58. Violations of the Service's procedural manual or informal
guidelines are not considered violations of the administrative steps of the Code.
United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 331 (D. Mass.), appeal
dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623
F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to the second party,
623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980).
32. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 536-37 (5th Cir. 1982); see
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); United States v. Silvestain, 668 F.2d
1161, 1163 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1034 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 607
F.2d 61, 71 (3d Cir. 1979); Barnhart v. United Penn Bank, 515 F. Supp. 1198, 1201
(M.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1154
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in part on other grounds, rev'd in part on other grounds, 677
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982).
33. See United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 & n.2 (information already in
possession of Service and non-relevance), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); United
States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 998 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (all four
elements); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 328-331 (D.
Mass.) (same), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party
dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), affd
as to the second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 949-50 (D. Colo. 1975) (information already in possession of Service and non-relevance), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
34. Nath, supra note 8, at 1574-75; see Caplin, supra note 14, at 199; A Balancing Approach, supra note 10, at 193.
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The viability of this argument depends on the standard of relevance
to be applied. Although the Supreme Court has not formulated a test
for determining the relevance required before a summons issued pursuant to section 7602 of the Code will be enforced, 35 the summons
power of the IRS has been interpreted consistently as a "broad mandate, designed to give the Service the 'authority ... necessary for the
effective enforcement of the revenue laws.' "36
In accordance with the view that the summons power of the IRS is
to be liberally construed, 37 federal courts interpreting the Powell requirement of relevance 38 have considered the threshold to be a low
one. 39 The standard commonly employed is that the summons must
seek information that "might throw light upon the correctness of the
taxpayer's return. ' 40 Certain courts have further refined this test,
35. The relevance of the summoned documents was not at issue in Powell. United
States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d
615 (10th Cir. 1977); A Balancing Approach, supra note 10, at 194.
36. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 1982)
(quoting United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1980)); accord United States v.
Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975). The breadth of the Service's power to investigate
the records of taxpayers is commonly characterized as analogous to the inquisitorial
power of a grand jury. E.g., United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 619
(10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918
(1972); see Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir.) (case concerning
enforcement of summons issued pursuant to § 3633 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1933, 26 U.S.C. § 3633 (1933), predecessor of § 7602 of the 1954 Code), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 864 (1953).
37. E.g., United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Schwartz, 469 F.2d 977, 982 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Widelski, 452
F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
38. See supra notes 26-27, 29 and accompanying text.
39. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923

(1979).
40. United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293, 300 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Foster v.
United States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1960));
accordUnited States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512,
515 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970). When, however, the summons is directed not at the
taxpayer himself but at a third party, a greater showing of relevance may be
required, because "judicial protection against the sweeping or irrelevant order is
particularly appropriate in matters where the demand for records is directed ... to
a third party who may have had some dealing with the person under investigation."
United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968); see, e.g., Venn v.
United States, 400 F.2d 207, 211-12 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 948 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.
1977); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Involving Charles Rice, 483 F.
Supp. 1085, 1089 (D. Minn. 1979) (grand jury subpoena for tax accrual workpapers).
But see Nath, supra note 8, at 1576-77 n.66 (suggesting that Harringtoncannot fairly
be read as imposing a higher degree of relevance for third party summonses).
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requiring that the government demonstrate "a realistic expectation
41
rather than an idle hope that something may be discovered."
Relevance is implicit when the Service is seeking production of
factual records of potentially taxable transactions. 42 Tax accrual
workpapers, however, are not records of transactions, but rather
contain the thoughts and theories of the corporate taxpayer and its
independent auditor concerning the tax consequences of past transactions. 43 Although these workpapers are relevant when the Service is
attempting to establish fraud, intent being an integral part of the
is only conburden of proof, 44 relevance is tenuous when the Service
45
cerned with the correctness of the taxpayer's return.
In United States v. Coopers & Lybrand,46 the first appellate decision on this issue, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding
of an insufficient relationship between the "highly speculative and
conjectural ' 47 tax accrual workpapers and the purpose for which they
were summoned, the determination of tax liability. 48 The court, in
determining that the workpapers were not relevant, stressed that these
papers had not been created or used in the preparation of tax

41. United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973) (quoting United
States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968)). This language has subsequently been ignored by the Second Circuit. See United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., 677 F.2d 211, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 12526 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979):
42. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 950 (D. Colo. 1975),
aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); see, e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293,
301 (5th Cir. 1981) (information concerning the payment of illegal bribes); United
States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45, 50 (10th Cir. 1974) (bank
records of customer's deposits and cancelled checks); United States v. Shlom, 420
F.2d 263, 265 (2d. Cir. 1969) (record of receipts, kept for sales monitoring purposes),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970); United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 52325 (2d Cir. 1968) (alimony payment records).
43. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
44. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220-21 (2d Cir.
1982); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 330 (D. Mass.),
appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as
moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to the
second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum Involving Charles Rice, 483 F. Supp. 1085, 1088 & n.2 (D. Minn. 1979)
(grand jury subpoena for tax accrual workpapers).
45. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 548 (5th Cir. 1982) (Carwood, J., dissenting); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 950
(D. Colo. 1975), affd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); A BalancingApproach, supra
note 10, at 195-96.
46. 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
47. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953 (D. Colo. 1975),
aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
48. Id. at 954.
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returns. 49 In suggesting that a document's use in connection with such
preparation is a touchstone of its relevance, 50 however, the court may
have been impressed by the fact that such documents implicitly (and
customarily) establish the tax consequences of corporate transactions, 51 unlike documents containing the thoughts and theories of the
taxpayer and his independent auditor.
Although Coopers & Lybrand has been viewed as unduly emphasizing the fact that tax accrual workpapers are not prepared as part of
the tax return process, 52 this was not the sole basis for the court's
determination that the workpapers were not relevant. 53 Rather, the
court was concerned that the Service was seeking the documents
merely for their value as a roadmap through the soft spots in the
return. 54 Recognizing that relevance connotes more than convenience,
the court concluded that the government had failed to establish relevance 55 and denied enforcement of the summons. 56 Nonetheless, the
courts that have considered the relevance of tax accrual workpapers
since Coopers & Lybrand have reached the contrary result. 57 How49. 550 F.2d at 621. The court also stressed that the accounting firm had no
responsibility for the preparation of its client's tax returns. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 618.
52. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
923 (1979); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 329 (D.
Mass.), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed
as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), afJ'd as to the
second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum Involving Charles Rice, 483 F. Supp. 1085, 1088 (D. Minn. 1979) (grand jury
subpoena for tax accrual workpapers).
53. See 550 F.2d at 620-21. The decision is frequently viewed, however, as
turning primarily on this point. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d
211, 219 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322,
329 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party
dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd
as to the second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); Nath, supra note 8, at 1578.
54. See 550 F.2d at 621.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 537-38 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982). All district courts
confronted with the issue since the Coopers & Lybrand decision have similarly
rejected that holding, finding that the workpapers are relevant. United States v.
Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United States
v. Riley Co., 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1164 (P-H) 80-551 (N.D. Ill. 1980); United States
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d
569 (1st Cir. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to the second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st
Cir. 1980); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Involving Charles Rice,
483 F. Supp. 1085, 1089 (D. Minn. 1979) (grand jury subpoena for tax accrual
workpapers).
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ever, although these courts nominally applied the "may shed light"
test of relevance, they appear to have found the documents relevant
for the convenience they represent. These courts thus may be employing an entirely different standard of relevance.
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,58 the Second Circuit held
tax accrual workpapers to be relevant to the Service's inquiry, 59 reasoning that because "[d]ifferent tax positions lead to different amounts
of liability [it would be] difficult to say that the assessment by the
independent auditor of the correctness of positions taken [on the]
' 06
return would not throw 'light upon' the correctness of the return.
The court, however, did not respond persuasively to the argument
that because tax liability depends not on how the taxpayer or his
accountant views transactions that have already taken place, but
rather on the consequences of the taxpayer's actual transactions, the
workpapers do not shed light on the question of actual tax liability.6'
Thus, although the court's articulated reasoning was that the workpapers meet the "may throw light upon" test of relevance, 62 it is not clear
how such papers are in fact relevant. Rather, it appears that the court
considered the workpapers relevant because of the convenience that
they represent to the Service. As the court itself noted, the IRS has
access to all the data it needs to calculate the taxpayer's liability, 63 and
the roadmap provided by the workpapers would "merely save the IRS
some time in finding the best arguments for asserting a deficiency. "64
In United States v. El Paso Co.,65 the Fifth Circuit was similarly
persuaded that tax accrual workpapers are relevant, 6 holding that the
58. 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982).
59. Id. at 218-19. In holding the workpapers to be relevant, the court rejected
the defendant Arthur Young & Co.'s contention that because the summons was not
directed at the taxpayer, but rather at a third party record keeper, a higher showing
of relevancy should be required. Id. at 215-17. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text. In refusing to require a higher standard, the court noted that Arthur Young &
Co. had been hired to investigate the taxpayer's financial affairs, and to involve itself
in matters that were likely to be the object of a governmental inquiry. Id. at 216.
There was thus no question of invading the privacy of a third party against his will.
Cf. United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1978) (threshold of relevance is
"particularly low" when summons is directed at corporate employee), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 923 (1979).
60. 677 F.2d at 219.
61. Id. at 218.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 220.
64. Id.
65. 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
66. Id. at 537-38. Although the court was concerned with a summons for tax
accrual workpapers that had been prepared by the corporation itself, it employed the
same standard of relevance as that employed by courts confronted with a summons
seeking production of the same documents prepared by independent accountants. See
id. at 534, 537.
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documents may shed light on the corporation's tax liability. 67 This
court also appears to have considered the workpapers relevant because
of the convenience that access would represent to the Service. As the
court stated: "Documents that focus and concentrate the Service's
energy on questionable positions in the return. . . are highly relevant."'6 The emphasis on the convenience these workpapers afford to
the Service indicates that a standard other than "may shed light" is
being used. Instead, convenience is being viewed as sufficient to establish relevance.
That Congress intended the summons power of the Service to reach
non-factual documents solely because of the convenience that they
represent is unlikely.6 9 Although the grant of power to the Service is a
broad mandate, 70 it is nevertheless a "limited power, and should be
kept within its proper bounds." ' 7' Section 7602 of the Code provides
that the Service may examine any "books, papers, records, or other
data" that may be relevant to the inquiry. 72 The phrase "other data"
suggests that those books, papers and records referenced must be
generally similar to "data. ' 73 Documents containing opinions, theo-

67. Id. at 537-38.
68. Id. at 537.
69. When the government is attempting to establish fraud on the part of the
taxpayer, however, the documents are independently relevant because they may shed
light on the taxpayer's intent to defraud. United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
474 F. Supp. 322, 330 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979),
appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1021 (1980), aff'd as to the second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); cf. In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Involving Charles Rice, 483 F. Supp. 1085,
1088 (D. Minn. 1979) (grand jury subpoena for tax accrual workpapers). Precisely
because the taxpayers were charged with fraud, each court rejected the contention
that the workpapers were being sought solely for their convenience. 474 F. Supp. at
330; see 483 F. Supp. at 1088 & n.2. As the court in Arthur Andersen recognized, the
workpapers were "clearly more than 'convenient' or a 'roadmap' [because] such
evidence of knowledge of potential discrepencies appears to go directly to the heart of
determining whether there has been civil or criminal fraud." 474 F. Supp. at 330
(footnote omitted).
70. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
71. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141. 151 (1975) (quoting People ex rel.
McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463, 482, 2 N.E. 615, 625 (1885)); see United States v.
Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968).
72. I.R.C. § 7602(1) (1976) (emphasis added). See supra note 23 for full text.
73. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 548 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood,
J., dissenting). This interpretation, however, has been characterized as contrary to
the doctrine of ejusdem generis, see Nath, supra note 8, at 1613, a principle of
statutory construction that provides that when general words follow an enumeration
of words of a specific meaning, the general words are not to be construed to their
widest extent, but are to be construed as applying only to things of the same general
kind or class as those specifically mentioned. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 47.17 (4th ed. 1973); Black's Law Dictionary 464 (5th ed.

1982]

IRS ACCESS TO TAX ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS

479

ries and legal analyses, rather than4factual data, are therefore beyond
7
the scope of the summons power.
Former Commissioner Mortimer M. Caplin recently advocated this
interpretation. 75 Noting that little discussion has taken place on the
scope of the word "data," Caplin argued that "[w]hat comes to mind
in the use of that term are items such as books, records and other
factual materials-not opinions, projections, conjectures and other
thought processes." ' 76 While recognizing that information of the second type would be of convenience to the Service, Caplin concluded
that it is dubious that Congress intended this category of work product
to be readily available to the IRS.7 7 Moreover, if Congress had such an
intent, a more likely wording of section 7602 would have provided for
the power to examine books, papers, records, or other data "relevant
'to making such inquiry' or 'to performing such inquiry.' "71 Accordingly, Congress used the word "inquiry" not in the sense of the procedure to be followed, but rather "in the sense of 'question,' to refer to
the subject matter inquired about . . . . "711 Therefore, section 7602
permits the summoning of material relevant to the correctness of the
tax return, but not material that merely facilitates the process. Because the usefulness of tax accrual workpapers lies in their convenience as a roadmap, they are beyond the summons power of the IRS.
B. Relevance in Large CorporateAudits
In audits of medium and large corporations, it has been argued that
without access to tax accrual workpapers, the Service will be unable
to perform a thorough audit 0° Accordingly, because in audits of such
corporations the IRS is not seeking tax accrual workpapers for mere

1979). The doctrine, however, is only an aid to statutory construction. United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981). Also, because the doctrine works to limit the
general words in a phrase to the character of the specific words, the specific words
must be a subset of the general for the doctrine to apply. See id. at 581-82; Mason v.
United States, 260 U.S. 545, 553-54 (1923). "Books, papers, and records" are not a
subset of "data" because they exist in many other forms such as picture books or
poetry. Because "of data" is not a more general description of "books, papers, and
records," the doctrine should not be used to interpret the wording of § 7602. See 452
U.S. at 582.
74. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 548 (Garwood, J., dissenting);
Caplin, supra note 14, at 199.
75. Caplin, supra note 14, at 199.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 199-200.
78. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 546 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 546 (emphasis in original).
80. Nath, supra note 8, at 1585.
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convenience, but rather out of necessity,8 ' the workpapers should be
considered relevant.

While it is true that the Service has limited resources and, as a
practical matter, must rely to a great extent on the integrity of the
corporation's internal and independent auditors,8 2 it nonetheless has
access to sufficient relevant documentation to perform such audits
properly. 3 For example, the courts have almost without exception
enforced summonses for the factual audit workplans created by the
independent auditor in his determination of whether the corporation's
books and records fairly reflect its revenues and expenses. 84 The Service may thus rely on the auditor's assessment of the correctness of the
corporation's records, 85 and focus its energies instead on whether the

tax treatment of the underlying transactions comports with the law.
While access to tax accrual workpapers would certainly make the
Service's task easier by focusing its attention on the transactions the
accountant viewed as the subject of questionable positions, 8 "[t]he
corporation's own books and the audit workpapers furnish the IRS

81. Id. As an example of what may be involved in an audit of a large corporation, the author notes that the record in United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550
F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977), contains references to the corporate taxpayer's 3000
company computer programs, 90,000 separate accounts, and 200,000 monthly invoices. Nath, supra note 8, at 1585.
82. Nath, supra note 8, at 1585.
83. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982); see
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 547 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood, J.,
dissenting); Auditors Say IRS Demand for Documents is Poisoning Relations with
Client Firms, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1981, at 25, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as IRS
Demand for Documents].
84. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 216-17 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 324 n.2, 325 n.3, 332 (D.
Mass.), appeal dismissed, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979), appealof one party dismissed
as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to the
secondparty, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); Nath, supra note 8, at 1584-85; cf. United
States v. Noall,- 587 F.2d 123, 126-27 (2d Cir. 1978) (summons for audit workplans
prepared by in-house accountants), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). But see United
States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977) (denying enforcement).
For a background discussion on audit procedures that generate audit workplans, see
Handbook of Accounting, supra note 5, at 12-1 to 12-7.
85. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 1982);
Nath, supra note 8, at 1584. In Arthur Young the Second Circuit found the audit
workplans to be relevant not because of the convenience that they might represent,
but rather because they do shed light on the correctness of the return: "Tax liability
depends on a taxpayer's actual revenue and expenses, not on his bookkeeping. The
IRS has an appropriate interest in ensuring that the latter accurately reflects the
former." 677 F.2d at 216.
86. IRS DemandforDocuments, supra note 83. The reporter quotes an IRS team
coordinator as saying: "If we can get the papers, we can make a determination (of tax
liability) much quicker .... ." Id. at col. 6; see Caplin, supra note 14, at 194. See
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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with all the raw data that it needs to calculate the taxpayer's tax
liability.

'8 7

Consequently, because the Service's reliance on tax ac-

crual workpapers does not rise to the level of necessity, the workpapers do not become relevant for that reason alone. That the Service
does not require these documents is further evidenced by the fact that
compelled production of tax accrual workpapers is a relatively recent
phenomenon. 8 Because tax accrual workpapers do not meet the applicable standard of relevance,"9 courts should decline enforcement of
summonses seeking their compelled production.

II. POLICY
A. Threat to FinancialDisclosure under the Securities Laws
Another, and perhaps more convincing argument against compelled production of tax accrual workpapers is that, should these
papers be readily available to the IRS,90 a corporation might conceal

87. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982).
Although the court did not particularize the size of the audit involved in Arthur
Young, the audit was clearly of the large scale that has been characterized as
impossible to perform without access to tax accrual workpapers. See supra notes 8081 and accompanying text. The subject of the audit in Arthur Young was Amerada
Hess, a Fortune 500 company. The 500, Fortune, May 1982, at 258, 260. The audit
covered a three-year period of operations. 677 F.2d at 214, 215 n.4.
88. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 547 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood, J., dissenting) ("After all, for a great many years the Service effectively
employed its summons power in routine audits . . . of large corporate taxpayers
without the necessity of attempting to acquire their 'tax pool' analyses.").
89. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. However, the workpapers are
independently relevant when the government must establish fraudulent intent. See
supra notes 44, 69 and accompanying text.
90. Although the Service has recently amended its procedure manual to instruct
its field agents not to routinely summon tax accrual workpapers, 1 Internal Revenue
Manual (Audit) (CCH) ch. 4024.4, at 7019 (May 14, 1981), the Service does not
appear to be exercising restraint in summoning these workpapers. In Arthur Young,
decided over a year after the new guidelines were issued, the Second Circuit referred
to the "Service's emerging practice of requesting tax accrual workpapers." 677 F.\2d
at 217 (footnote omitted). Also, as noted by former Commissioner Caplin, "[present]
Commissioner Kurtz will not give up easily on this issue." Caplin, supra note 14, at
199; see The IRS Plays Hardball,J. Acct., June 1981, at 119. Furthermore, violations
by the IRS of the Manual are not considered a violation of the Powell requirement
that the administrative steps required by the Code must be followed. See supra note
31 and accompanying text. The Manual's provision that tax accrual workpapers
should not routinely be sought thus "provides scant protection for the taxpayer." A
BalancingApproach, supra note 10, at 192 (footnote omitted). See generally Parnell,

The Internal Revenue Manual: Its Utility and Legal Effect, 32 Tax Law. 687, 699701 (1979) (discussion of legal ramifications of the Manual).
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its contingent tax liabilities from its independent auditors, thus preventing the auditors from verifying the accuracy of the corporation's
financial statements. 91 Because the financial statements required by
the securities laws may be the most significant element on which
investors in the financial market base their investment decisions, 92 the
public interest requires
that integrity in the independent auditing
93
process be fostered.
The concern that the independent auditing process, and ultimately
the integrity of the securities market, will suffer 94 should the IRS have
access to tax accrual workpapers is based on the belief that the free
and candid client-auditor exchange regarding the existence of contingent liabilities, which is vital to the effectiveness of the financial audit
process, is largely founded upon the client's expectation of confidentiality. 95 Absent such confidentiality, the client would not feel free to
reveal to his auditor the potential weaknesses in the tax return, thus
impairing the ability of the auditor to evaluate the corporation's
contingent tax reserve. 96
Whether the free flow of information between client and auditor
will in fact be hampered depends, however, on whether there are
sufficient independent reasons for a corporation to be candid with its
auditors even though the Service might gain access to the resulting
documentation. 97 Corporations have an obligation under the secur-

91. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953-54 (D. Colo. 1975),
aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); Caplin, supra note 14, at 199; Garbis &
Struntz, supra note 21, at 67; A BalancingApproach, supra note 10, at 190. See
supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
92. L. Rappaport, supra note 4, at 2.1; see United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
677 F.2d 211, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1982). See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
93. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1982);
Garbis & Struntz, supra note 21, at 67.
94. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219-20 (2d Cir.
1982); Garbis & Struntz, supra note 21, at 67; A BalancingApproach, supra note 10,
at 190.
95. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953-54 (D. Colo. 1975),
aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); Caplin, supra note 14, at 199; IRS Demandfor
Documents, supra note 83, at cols. 4-5.
96. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953-54 (D. Colo. 1975),
aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); IRS Demandfor Documents, supra note 83, at
cols. 4-5.
97. Nath, supra note 8, at 1590-91. In United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530
(5th Cir. 1982), the court accepted the argument that a corporation has sufficient
independent reasons to assist in the creation of comprehensive tax accrual workpa-

1982]

IRS ACCESS TO TAX ACCRUAL WORKPAPERS

483

ities laws to maintain a reserve for contingent tax liabilities,9" and to
cooperate with their auditors' efforts to evaluate the adequacy of this
reserve. A corporation not complying with this process would be
violating its obligations under the securities laws, 99 a factor that in the
past has prompted corporations to be candid in discussing questionable tax positions with their independent auditors. An additional
incentive to be candid lies in the knowledge that an auditor, suspecting undisclosed contingent liabilities, would decline to certify the
corporation's financial statements or would issue a qualified opinion. 00 A corporation threatened with an "unclean" opinion arguably
would prefer to be candid with its auditors even though the Service
could reach the resulting workpapers. 101
The prejudice to the corporation should the Service access the
0 2 The workpapers
underlying workpapers, however, is considerable.1
highlight the soft spots in the return and expose the settlement and
litigation positions that management is prepared to take upon challenge by the IRS. 103 Divulging this information puts the corporation at
such a disadvantage when audited by the IRS "that a prudent organization might not be perfectly candid with independent auditors" if
such information would be reachable under section 7602.104 That
pers. Id. at 544. Initially, the court rejected the premise that corporations would
flout their obligations under the securities laws. Id. See infra note 99 and accompanying text. Additionally, the court was convinced that concern about being denied
certification would prompt candor. 682 F.2d at 544. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. The court was substantially in agreement on these points with the
dissenting opinion in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 222-24 (2d
Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
98. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02(25) (1982). See supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
99. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 544 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 223 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Nath, supra note 8, at 1590-91.
100. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 544 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 224 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part)); Nath, supra note 8, at 1592-93. Accountants
have a duty to withhold certification or issue a qualified opinion if they feel that the
financial statements have not been properly prepared. AICPA Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 31, J. Acct., Mar. 1981, at 122. This statement, issued in 1981, was
intended as a reminder to members of the profession that when an auditor is prevented from examining data that he or she considers necessary to audit a tax accrual,
the auditor should consider issuing a qualified opinion or disclaiming the opinion.
IRS to Clarify Rules LimitingAgents' Probesof Tax Work-papers, J. Acct., May 1981
at 8.
101. See Nath, supra note 8, at 1593.
102. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982).
103. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 1982);
Garbis & Struntz, supra note 21, at 66; A BalancingApproach, supra note 10, at 18990; IRS Demand for Documents, supra note 83, at col. 4. See supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
104. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982).
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corporations may not be candid with their auditors is indicated by the
accounting profession's deep concern that their corporate clients will
not provide sufficient information to permit the evaluation of contingent tax reserves. 10 5 Furthermore, even though the practice of summoning tax accrual workpapers is relatively recent,1 16 members of the
profession have already noticed that clients have in fact become reluctant to discuss sensitive tax areas. 10 7 As noted by one professional,
"[e]very major corporation, faced with the thought that [its] auditors
will have to make disclosures that they didn't have to in the past, is
positioning itself to defend its privacy." 108 Considerable evidence thus
indicates that the free flow of information concerning tax contingencies will be impaired despite the independent reasons that would
seemingly prompt a corporation to remain candid with its independent accountants. 10 9 Absent such free flow of information, accountants will be unable to verify the adequacy of their clients' contingent
tax reserves, with resulting detriment to financial reporting under the
securities laws.
B. A Work-Product Privilegefor
Tax Accrual Workpapers
The Supreme Court has recognized that contrary legislative purposes may undercut the broad grant of authority to the IRS under
section 7602 of the Code." 0 Because it appears that financial disclosure under the securities laws will suffer should the IRS have routine
access to tax accrual workpapers," l ' courts considering enforcement of
105. IRS Demand for Documents, supra note 83, at col. 5; see Caplin, supra note
14, at 197 n.1, 199. Former Commissioner Caplin has noted that the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has formed a special committee to
deal with the problem. Id. at 197 n.1.
106. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
107. InterpretationGuides Auditor Who Cannot Obtain Evidence on Income Tax
Accruals, J. Acct., Mar. 1981, at 18, 20; IRS Demandfor Documents, supra note 83,
at col. 4.
108. IRS Demand for Documents, supra note 83, at col. 5 (remarks of David
Bucholz, Managing Director, Tax Policy and Procedure, Arthur Andersen & Co.,
Chicago, Ill.).
109. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953 (D. Colo.
1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). The court quoted extensively the testimony of an expert witness: "[W]ith that information available to the revenue agent
just for the asking, I think it would terribly impede and I think eventually destroy the
system of auditing that we have established because it would eliminate the freedom
that the client feels of being able to muse with us about, well, what if this capital
gains is treated as an ordinary income?" Id. But see United States v. El Paso Co., 682
F.2d 530, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1982) (court considered "wholly speculative" the argument that corporations would not continue to be candid with their independent
auditors).
110. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1980).
111. But see United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1982)
(court did not accept that the accuracy of financial reporting would suffer if tax
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a summons for these workpapers should determine whether the policies of disclosure vindicated by the securities laws
justify restricting
12
the power of the Service to summon documents.
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,113 the Second Circuit
expressed concern about the effect that enforcing IRS summonses for
tax accrual workpapers would have on the securities market.1 4 In
denying enforcement of such a summons, the court balanced the
Service's need for the information contained in the tax accrual
workpapers against the policies of disclosure represented by the securities laws.115 While investors were found to rely "most exclusively" on
the statements generated as a result of corporate compliance with the
securities laws,1'6 the IRS was found to have access to sufficient other
material to enable it to make a determination of the correctness of the
tax return." 7 Because the harm resulting from granting the Service
routine access to tax accrual workpapers would be substantial," 8
whereas the collection of revenues could continue relatively unhampered even though access is denied, the court concluded that protection must be afforded the independent auditing process." 9
To provide such protection, the court fashioned a work-product
privilege 12 0 similar to that developed for the work product of attorneys
in Hickman v. Taylor.'2 ' In Hickman, the Supreme Court provided
the attorney with a sheltered area in which to prepare his client's case
without concern that his thought processes will be discoverable by the

accrual workpapers were available to the IRS). See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text. Consequently, the court did not need to make inroads in the summons
power of the Service. See id. at 544.
112. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982); see
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1982); Garbis & Struntz,
supra note 21, at 67.
113. 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982).
114. Id. at 220-21.
115. Id. at 219. The court viewed Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), as
requiring it "to balance strong public policies against a party's need for information
whenever a conflict between the two arises." 677 F.2d at 219. See infra notes 118-19
and accompanying text.
116. 677 F.2d at 220-21.
117. Id. at 220. In finding that the Service has access to all the documentation that
it needs, the court specifically excepted cases involving fraud on the part of the
taxpayer. Absent allegations of fraud, the Service does not need to know the taxpayer's thoughts. Id. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. When the taxpayer is
under investigation for fraud, the court suggests that the Service may have made a
sufficient showing of need to override the privilege. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
118. 677 F.2d at 220-21; see United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 544 (5th
Cir. 1982).
119. 677 F.2d at 220-21.
120. Id. at 221.
121. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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opposing party.1 22 Similarly, the accountant work-product privilege
provides the independent auditor with a protected area in which he
23
may freely analyze his corporate client's contingent tax liabilities.
The accountant work-product privilege is a sound response to the
concerns posed by routine enforcement of summonses for tax accrual
workpapers. As structured by the Second Circuit, the privilege shelters only the work that independent auditors, retained by publicly
owned companies, put into the preparation of workpapers created to
assist their client's compliance with the federal securities laws.12 4 Furthermore, the Service may override the privilege by making a showing
of substantial need, such as when the corporation's records have been
destroyed by fire. 25 The objectives of the securities laws are thus
achieved without undue interference with the collection of national
revenues. 126
The dissent in Arthur Young, however, viewed the enactment by
Congress of section 7602 as preempting the power of the judiciary to
27
restrict the summons authority beyond the "traditional" privileges
to which the Supreme Court held the summons power subject in
Upjohn Co. v. United States. 28 However, Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 2 9 which governs the existence of privileges in
federal courts, provides that privileges "shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience." 1° Congress, in enacting Rule 501, did not intend to freeze the law of
privileges as then in existence, but rather intended the law to "continue to be developed by the courts." 13' Therefore, the judiciary has
the power to recognize any new privileges that are justifiable "in light
of reason and experience." Such privileges become part of the federal
common law and, under the rule of Upjohn, act to restrict the summons power of the Service. 32 The majority in Arthur Young, having
found that the integrity of the securities market would be jeopardized
122. Id. at 510-11; see United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) ("At its
core, the work-product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case.").
123. See 677 F.2d at 219-20.
124. Id. at 219; see Garbis & Struntz, supra note 21, at 69.
125. 677 F.2d at 221 & n. 10. If the corporation is under investigation for fraud,
there may be a sufficient showing of need to overcome the privilege. But see Garbis &
Struntz, supra note 21, at 69 (suggesting that the privilege does not apply at all if
there are allegations of fraud).
126. See id. at 220-21. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
127. 677 F.2d at 222 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
128. 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981).
129. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
130. Id.
131. Id. report of House Committee on the Judiciary.
132. See Garbis & Struntz, supra note 21, at 68-69.
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if the Service could freely access tax accrual workpapers 133 therefore
had the power to fashion a privilege protecting them.
The dissent in Arthur Young further criticized the privilege as
facilitating duties already imposed by law134 (maintenance of accurate financial statements), whereas privileges are traditionally created
to promote a relationship not already served by independent legal
obligations and which would be impaired absent the protection afforded by the privilege. 3 5 The work-product privilege, however, was
not created for the purpose of protecting the relationship between
accountant and client, but rather to ensure the vindication of an
important public policy, the integrity of the marketplace. 3 That the
relationship and communications made therein are also protected is
incidental. Similarly, the attorney work-product privilege was not
created for the purpose of protecting non-privileged communications
made to the attorney, but rather to ensure "an orderly working of our
system of legal procedure."'1 37 In each instance, it is the thought
processes essential to achieve an important public policy that are
being sheltered. The creation of the accountant's work-product privilege is thus a valid response to the concern that access by the Service to
tax accrual workpapers will result
in "inaccuracy and untrustworthi38
ness" in financial reporting.

133. 677 F.2d at 220-21.
Id. at 224 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
135. Id. In his treatise on privileges, Professor Wigmore predicates four fundamental conditions as prerequisites to the existence of a privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation.
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis and footnote
omitted).
The dissent in Arthur Young further suggested that to the extent the majority
created a privilege to encourage the client to communicate with its accountant, it
created a testimonial privilege for the corporation, rather than a work-product
privilege for the accountant. 677 F.2d at 223 n.5 (Newman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). That such communications are sheltered, however, is incidental
to the court's purpose.
136. 677 F.2d at 219, 221.
137. 329 U.S. at 512.
138. 677 F.2d at 221 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947)).
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CONCLUSION

The practice of summoning tax accrual workpapers poses a significant threat to the integrity of financial reporting under the securities
laws. Although courts may decline to enforce summonses directed at
these workpapers on the basis of non-relevance, a more effective way
to ensure that the workpapers are protected is to shelter them by
means of a privilege. A work-product privilege, similar to that existing
for the work-product of attorneys, is a sound way to provide this
protection. Such a privilege shelters the documents from the Service in
most instances, thus preventing the adverse impact on financial reporting that would result from the routine enforcement of summonses. At the same time, the privilege is defeasible by the IRS upon a
showing of substantial need. The integrity of financial reporting may
thus be maintained by an accountant's work-product privilege without compromising the collection of national revenues.
Katherine Pryor Burgeson

